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WHAT SHOULD DEFLATIONISM BE
WHEN IT GROWS UP?
ABSTRACT. I argue that a popular brand of deﬂationism about truth,
disquotationalism, does not adequately account for some central varieties of
truth ascription. For example, given Boyle’s Law is ‘‘The product of pres-
sure and volume is exactly a constant for an ideal gas’’, disquotationalism
does not explain why the blind ascription ‘‘Boyle’s Law is true’’ implies that
the product of pressure and volume is exactly a constant for an ideal gas,
and given Washington said only ‘‘Birds sing’’, disquotationalism does not
explain why the existentially quantiﬁed ascription ‘‘Something Washington
said is true’’ implies that birds sing. Thus disquotationalism fails to account
for all the facts about truth.
1.
Deﬂationism about truth maintains that we can account for the
primary uses of ‘‘is true’’ without appeal to a robust property of
truth. Varieties of deﬂationism (such as disquotationalism, min-
imalism, and prosententialism) can be distinguished by their
proposals for dealing with three central kinds of truth ascription;
a satisfactory deﬂationism must account for at least these three.1
In this paper I will show that a venerable brand of contemporary
deﬂationism,disquotationalism,doesnotmeet this requirement.2
My discussion concerns explicit, quantiﬁed, and blind truth
ascriptions. Explicit ascriptions pick out a particular sentence
or proposition which appears alongside ‘‘is true’’, as in:
(1) It is true that Fred is extravagant.
(2) ‘‘Fred is extravagant’’ is true.
In non-explicit ascriptions, the proposition or sentence to which
truth is being ascribed does not explicitly appear. Some are
universally or existentially quantiﬁed ascriptions, such as:
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(3) Everything Washington says is true.
(4) Something Washington said is true.
Others are blind ascriptions, in which a term refers to a par-
ticular, but unstated proposition or sentence, such as:
(5) Boyle’s Law is true
or, where Caleb has said ‘‘Fred is extravagant’’:
(6) What Caleb said is true.
Disquotationalism is celebrated for its ability to handle non-
explicit ascriptions.3 But I will argue that, of the non-explicit
ascriptions, disquotationalism adequately handles at most
universally quantiﬁed ascriptions, failing to account for the
logical properties of blind and existentially quantiﬁed ascrip-
tions. For example, disquotationalism does not explain why
given that Caleb said ‘‘Fred is extravagant’’ the blind ascription
(6) implies that Fred is extravagant, and it does not explain why
given that Washington said only ‘‘The cherry tree ﬂowers in the
spring’’ the existentially quantiﬁed ascription (4) implies that
the cherry tree ﬂowers in the spring.4 I show the former in
section 3 and the latter in section 6. The defense of my thesis
begins in section 2, where I outline the disquotationalist anal-
ysis of explicit and non-explicit ascriptions. In sections 4 and 5,
I consider and reject objections to the main premises of my
argument.
2.
According to Quinean disquotationalism (1970), the truth
predicate does not work like other predicates; rather, it is a
device of semantic ascent in both explicit and non-explicit
ascriptions.5 For example, (2) is an indirect way of saying
something about the world – that Fred is extravagant. In ex-
plicit ascriptions like (2) ‘‘is true’’ performs disquotation; in
eﬀect it cancels the quotation marks around ‘‘Fred is extrava-
gant’’. For disquotationalism, the truth predicate’s utility is
best exhibited in non-explicit truth ascriptions, where it enables
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us to express inﬁnite conjunctions and disjunctions. Disquota-
tionalism holds that a universally quantiﬁed ascription such as
(3) is shorthand for an inﬁnite conjunction such as:
(7) If Washington says ‘‘The cherry tree ﬂowers every year’’,
then the cherry tree ﬂowers every year
and if Washington says ‘‘The cherry tree has been van-
dalized’’, then the cherry tree has been vandalized
and if Washington says ‘‘The cherry tree is in the garden’’,
then the cherry tree is in the garden
and . . .
There will be one conjunct for every sentence Washington
might say. Disquotationalism holds that an existentially
quantiﬁed ascription such as (4) is equivalent to an inﬁnite
disjunction such as:
(8) Washington said ‘‘The cherry tree ﬂowers every year’’ and
the cherry tree ﬂowers every year
or Washington said ‘‘The cherry tree has been vandal-
ized’’ and the cherry tree has been vandalized
or Washington said ‘‘The cherry tree is in the garden’’ and
the cherry tree is in the garden
or . . .
Finally, disquotationalism holds that blind ascriptions, like
existentially quantiﬁed ascriptions, are equivalent to inﬁnite
disjunctions.6 For example, (5) is equivalent to:
(9) Boyle’s Law is ‘‘The product of pressure and volume is
exactly a constant for an ideal gas’’ and the product of
pressure and volume is exactly a constant for an ideal gas
or Boyle’s Law is ‘‘grass is green’’ and grass is green
or . . .7
There is no doubt that (3) and (7), (4) and (8), and (5) and (9)
are materially equivalent. However, the main argument of this
paper will show that material equivalence is insuﬃcient to
disquotationalism’s needs, at least where blind and existentially
quantiﬁed ascriptions are concerned.
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In the course of the discussion, it will be helpful to keep in
mind disquotationalism’s method for preserving material
equivalence with cases involving indexicals. Suppose Fred says:
(10) I would not make a good clergyman
and Mary says:
(11) What Fred said is true.
A simple version of disquotationalism might individuate what
Fred said as a phonetic or orthographic type, and treat Mary’s
utterance (11) as shorthand for the inﬁnite disjunction:
(12) What Fred said is ‘‘I would not make a good clergyman’’
and I would not make a good clergyman
or what Fred said is ‘‘Fred would not make a good
clergyman’’ and Fred would not make a good clergyman
or . . .
But (10) and (12) will not share their truth value if, for example,
Fred would not make a good clergyman but Mary would.
Disquotationalism must deliver at a minimum material equiv-
alence of (10) and (12) by providing a disjunct something like:
(13) What Fred said is ‘‘I would not make a good clergyman’’
and Fred would not make a good clergyman.
To handle cases like this, Quine (1970) proposes that truth is
predicated of sentence tokens rather than of sentence types,
adding that the typing of sentences must be done in a way that
accommodates shifts in indexicals.8 Field (1994) proposes that
truth is predicated of a sentence on an occasion of utterance.
For Field (1994) the procedure for understanding an attribu-
tion of truth is not simple disquotation, but disquotation in-
dexed to speaker, place and time, and for Field (2001) sentences
are to be typed computationally.9 Let us assume that everything
will come out rosy if we treat blind ascriptions as ascriptions of
truth to sentence tokens, and employ disquotation that is suf-
ﬁciently complex so that the inﬁnite disjunction that is equiv-
alent to Mary’s blind ascription in eﬀect contains disjunct
(13).10
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In the course of the discussion, I will distinguish Whatever
ascriptions from JustSo ascriptions. For the disquotationalist,
the utility of ‘‘is true’’ is illustrated by blind ascriptions because
we can use them where we cannot supply the quote name of a
sentence. I will call blind ascriptions like this Whatever ascrip-
tions – for example, a speaker uses (5) to aﬃrm Boyle’s Law,
whatever it is. But not all blind ascriptions are Whatever
ascriptions – take, for example, Mary’s (11), where Fred’s (10) is
available to her. Here the disquotationalist can appeal to some
pragmatic or rhetorical reason to explain Mary’s choice of (11)
rather than the utterance ‘‘Fred would not make a good cler-
gyman’’ – for example, Mary might want to let Fred know that
she heard him. I will call ascriptions like this JustSo ascriptions.
3.
Let us say that a blind ascription selects11 a sentence or prop-
osition. For disquotationalism, the ascription (5) selects the
sentence:
(14) The product of pressure and volume is exactly a constant
for an ideal gas.
For minimalism, which admits propositions, (5) selects the
proposition:
(15)<The product of pressure and volume is exactly a con-
stant for an ideal gas>.
On the face of it, blind ascriptions have certain implications. In
our examples, given what Caleb said, (6) implies that Fred is
extravagant, whereas given that Boyle’s Law is what it is, (5)
implies that the product of pressure and volume is exactly a
constant for an ideal gas.12 Any adequate account of blind
ascriptions must have a smooth account of these kinds of
implication, drawing on three elements – the blind ascription
itself, the desired account of truth, and a premise specifying
what the blind ascription selects. Intuition suggests both that
blind ascriptions have such implications, and that no more than
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these three elements should be required to account for them.
Minimalism has an account of the appropriate implications
along these lines. The minimalist can argue from a blind
ascription to the requisite conclusion like this:
M1 Boyle’s Law is true.
[Assumption – (5)]
M2 Boyle’s Law is <The product of pressure and volume is
exactly a constant for an ideal gas>
[Assumption – (5) selects (15)]
M3<The product of pressure and volume is exactly a con-
stant for an ideal gas> is true if and only if the product
of pressure and volume is exactly a constant for an ideal
gas.
[Axiom of the minimalist theory]
M4<The product of pressure and volume is exactly a con-
stant for an ideal gas> is true.
[from M1, M2]
C The product of pressure and volume is exactly a constant
for an ideal gas.
[from M3, M4]13
The minimalist’s argument ﬁlls the bill – only three assumptions
are required, premise M1 giving the blind ascription itself,
premise M2 identifying Boyle’s Law, and premise M3
embodying an axiom of the minimalist theory of truth. The
parallel premises for disquotationalism should be D1, giving
the blind ascription, D2 identifying Boyle’s Law, and D3
embodying the disquotationalist analysis of blind ascriptions.
But to derive the Law, the disquotationalist requires in addition
to D3 something like D4:
D1 Boyle’s Law is true.
[Assumption – (5)]
D2 Boyle’s Law is ‘‘The product of pressure and volume is
exactly a constant for an ideal gas’’.
[Assumption – (5) selects (14)]
D3 Boyle’s Law is ‘‘The product of pressure and volume is
exactly a constant for an ideal gas’’ and the product of
pressure and volume is exactly a constant for an ideal gas
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or Boyle’s Law is ‘‘grass is green’’ and grass is green
or . . .
[Disq. analysis of D1 – (9)]
D4 Boyle’s Law is not ‘‘grass is green’’ and Boyle’s Law is not
‘‘e ¼ mc2’’ and . . .
[Assumption]
D5 Boyle’s Law is ‘‘The product of pressure and volume is
exactly a constant for an ideal gas’’ and the product of
pressure and volume is exactly a constant for an ideal gas.
[from D3, D4]
C The product of pressure and volume is exactly a constant
for an ideal gas.
[from D5]
Surprisingly, D2 is idle in this argument. D2 tells us that one of
the conjuncts of the ﬁrst disjunct of D3 is true, but that does
not imply the truth of the other conjunct of that disjunct. To
complete the derivation of C, we need D4. D4 guarantees the
falsity of each disjunct other than the ﬁrst of D3, allowing the
derivation of D5. If the disquotationalist account of blind
ascriptions was adequate, no extra premises along the lines of
D4 should be necessary – C should follow from the blind
ascription, a premise identifying Boyle’s Law, and the account
of blind ascriptions. Disquotationalists may think that D4 is
not really an additional premise, because they may think it
follows from D2. But I will show in section 4 that they are
mistaken.
For the moment let us suppose my argument goes through.
The argument shows that some versions of disquotationalism
are false – those versions that claim a very strong equivalence,
intensional equivalence, between blind ascriptions and inﬁnite
disjunctions.14 Intensionally equivalent sentences (i.e., sen-
tences equivalent in meaning) should imply the same sentences,
but blind ascriptions and their equivalent inﬁnite disjunctions
do not share their implications. Given the blind ascription (5),
and a premise identifying Boyle’s Law, and a commonsense
understanding of the truth predicate, we can conclude that the
product of pressure and volume is a constant for an ideal gas.
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But in the absence of an additional premise like D4, this con-
clusion cannot be drawn from the blind ascription (5), a pre-
mise identifying Boyle’s Law, and a disquotationalist
understanding of the truth predicate. Therefore, blind ascrip-
tions are not intensionally equivalent to inﬁnite disjunctions.15
The two are equivalent in some sense weaker than the inten-
sional.
My argument does not threaten the disquotationalist thesis
that blind ascriptions and the appropriate inﬁnite disjunctions
are in some sense equivalent, since there is no doubt that they
are materially equivalent.16 Nevertheless, it allows us to dis-
miss disquotationalism as an adequate theory of truth, be-
cause it shows that disquotationalism does not account for the
use of ‘‘is true’’ in blind ascriptions. I have assumed that the
blind ascription (5) implies that the product of pressure and
volume is exactly a constant for an ideal gas. If blind
ascriptions do have such implications, a complete explanation
of the facts about blind ascriptions should explain why they
imply what they do. But we cannot explain why the blind
ascription implies what it does by citing an equivalence (of
any kind) with an inﬁnite disjunction, since inﬁnite disjunc-
tions do not imply what blind ascriptions imply. Disquota-
tionalism cannot claim that there is nothing more to blind
ascriptions than their equivalence to inﬁnite disjunctions, be-
cause there is something more, something which allows the
blind ascription to imply the law more immediately (i.e., with
fewer additional premises) than the inﬁnite disjunction. In
short, if the disquotationalist accepts that a blind ascription
implies what it seems to, then she must deny that the equiv-
alence between the ascription and an inﬁnite disjunction ex-
hausts its function. No equivalence between blind ascriptions
and inﬁnite disjunctions, no matter how strong or how weak,
could account for those implications. The disquotationalist
account is incomplete – contrary to its bold claims, it does not
account for all the uses of ‘‘is true’’.
Perhaps this conclusion comes too fast. In each of sections 4
and 5, I will consider a tempting objection to this argument.
The ﬁrst objection tries to show that D2 implies D4, so that D1,
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D2 and D3 do after all imply C. The second holds that blind
ascriptions do not imply what they seem to, so there is no need
to demonstrate that D1, D2, and D3 imply C. Neither of these
objections is successful.
4.
Suppose that the disquotationalist objects that the conjuncts of
D4 follow from D2 – so, given D2, D4 is a logical freebie,
rather than an additional premise. Call statements of the form
‘‘Boyle’s Law is ‘grass is green’’’ I-statements.17 Disquotation-
alists may think that the truth of one I-statement such as
‘‘Boyle’s Law is ‘grass is green’’’ guarantees the falsity of all the
other I-statements (such as ‘‘Boyle’s Law is ‘e ¼ mc2’’’) to be
found in the inﬁnite disjunction. Then each conjunct of D4 is
guaranteed to be true, since each follows the pattern ‘‘Boyle’s
Law is not ‘e ¼ mc2’’’. The disquotationalist’s derivation of C
would mirror that of minimalism, containing only three ele-
ments – the blind ascription itself, the account of truth, and a
premise identifying Boyle’s Law. The implication of the blind
ascription would be assured, with nothing beyond what ought
to be necessary – so blind ascriptions and inﬁnite disjunctions
might be intensional equivalents, after all. I assume that dis-
quotationalists have had something like this in mind.18 But the
conjuncts of D4 are not logical freebies following from D2 – at
best they are contingent truths. To develop this objection and to
see why we should reject it will take some work, because we will
need to think about what is expressed by I-statements like
‘‘Boyle’s Law is ‘grass is green’’’.
Disquotationalists eschew talk of propositions, so assume
that for the disquotationalist, ‘‘Boyle’s Law’’ (both in the blind
ascription and on the left-hand side of I-statements) has a
sentence as its extension. Two options present themselves –
‘‘Boyle’s Law’’ might have as its extension either a sentence
token or a sentence type. If we take ‘‘Boyle’s Law’’ to have a
sentence token as its extension, we might treat I-statements as
token–token identities, or as statements telling us that the
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sentence token falls under a sentence type. If we take ‘‘Boyle’s
Law’’ to have a sentence type as its extension, we might treat I-
statements as type–type identities. Two methods of sentence
typing are relevant, orthographic and computational. I will
treat each of these possibilities in turn, showing that none is
satisfactory for disquotationalism. There is a reading of the
I-statements which is viable, but as we shall see, it involves
semantic sentence-typing, a method of typing that is not
available to disquotationalism.
Given the proﬀered disquotationalist solutions to the index-
ical problem, suppose ﬁrst that ‘‘Boyle’s Law’’ picks out a sen-
tence token.We can swiftly dismiss the view that I-statements are
token–token identities. If ‘‘Boyle’s Law’’ on the left-hand side of
an I-statement picks out a sentence on an occasion of utterance it
does not pick out the physically distinct token to be found on the
right-hand side of the I-statement in an inﬁnite disjunction. So I-
statements cannot express token–token identity, because if they
did, none of the I-statements would be true (cf. David, 1994, p.
153). So assume that the I-statement ‘‘Boyle’s Law is ‘grass is
green’’’ holds that the sentence token selected by ‘‘Boyle’s Law’’
belongs to the sentence type ‘‘grass is green’’.
As I noted above, there are a number of ways to type sen-
tences. Let us begin with orthographic typing. The disquota-
tionalist may think that the truth of ‘‘Boyle’s Law is ‘grass is
green’’’ (if it is true) logically precludes the truth of other
I-statements, such as ‘‘Boyle’s Law is ‘e ¼ mc2’’’. Formal lan-
guages normally forbid referring terms with more than one
referent, and if we follow this dictum here, ‘‘Boyle’s Law’’
cannot refer to more than one sentence token. Quote names
name uniquely, so that each sentence is named by a single quote
name: Treating quote names as picking out orthographic sen-
tence types, diﬀerent quote names pick out diﬀerent sentence
types.19 If ‘‘Boyle’s Law’’ picks out a sentence token, that token
cannot belong to more than one orthographic type. It follows
that as a logical matter at most one of the I-statements in the
inﬁnite disjunction could be true. Then the disquotationalist
might hold that the conjuncts of D4 are logical freebies: The
truth of the I-statement in D2 guarantees the falsity of the other
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I-statements, and thereby the truth of each conjunct of D4. If
this disquotationalist objection were sound, my argument to
the conclusion that blind ascriptions and inﬁnite disjunctions
diﬀer in their implications would not go through. However, the
objection is not sound.
The objection correctly points out that logical languages
normally forbid referring terms with more than one referent,
but the normal prohibition simpliﬁes natural language, where
ambiguous names are common. Since the disquotationalist’s
task is to account for the use of ‘‘is true’’ in everyday speech,
she cannot assume that in natural language the referring terms
in blind ascriptions pick out a single sentence token. It is highly
unlikely that ‘‘Boyle’s Law’’ univocally refers in English to a
sentence token. We have assumed that ‘‘Boyle’s Law’’ selects
(14). But there were any number of other tokens of Boyle’s Law
prior to my writing of (14). Furthermore, some of these fall
under diﬀerent orthographic types, e.g., ‘‘The pressure of an
ideal gas varies inversely with its volume at constant tempera-
ture’’. Tokens of these orthographic types have a very strong
claim to being Boyle’s Law.20 We cannot reasonably suppose
that the English term ‘‘Boyle’s Law’’ picks out a single sentence
token; thus, this reading of the I-statement of D2 oﬀers a
logical simpliﬁcation, along the lines of standard treatments of
ambiguous referring terms. But ‘‘Boyle’s Law’’ is a poor ﬁt with
the pattern of ambiguous referring terms. The multiplicity of
reference exhibited by ‘‘Boyle’s Law’’ in English is not like that
of the name ‘‘Smith’’ – ‘‘Smith’’ is certainly multivocal, picking
out multiple Smiths. But the alternative candidate sentences for
‘‘Boyle’s Law’’ are not as unrelated as the many Smiths. In the
case of ‘‘Boyle’s Law’’, we want to count all the candidate
sentences I am thinking of as the very same law, Boyle’s. If the
disquotationalist wants to appeal to the standard logical pro-
hibition on ambiguous referring terms, she must take the
implausible step of assimilating the English ‘‘Boyle’s Law’’ to
cases of ambiguous referring terms.
Once the implausible step is taken, and with the standard
prohibition on ambiguous referring terms in place, and
assuming that D2 is true, it turns out that the I-statement
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‘‘Boyle’s Law is ‘grass is green’’’ is false. That is good for the
disquotationalist – D2 implies a conjunct of D4. But further
diﬃculties arise. With orthographic sentence-typing, it also
turns out that ‘‘Boyle’s Law is ‘The pressure of an ideal gas
varies inversely with its volume at constant temperature’’’, is
false. Then D4, while derivable from D2, contains apparently
false conjuncts – e.g., ‘‘Boyle’s Law is not ‘The pressure of an
ideal gas varies inversely with its volume at constant tempera-
ture’’’. Moreover, in the case where Boyle’s Law is identiﬁed as
(14), so that D2 is true, while we can derive C we cannot derive
‘‘The pressure of an ideal gas varies inversely with its volume at
constant temperature’’. This reading of D2, then, is infelicitous.
Adopting the prohibition on ambiguous names may buy the
disquotationalist falsehood of the requisite I-statements, but
with the awkward presupposition that in English ‘‘Boyle’s
Law’’ is an ambiguous referring term and the uncomfortable
consequences that apparently true I-statements quoting alter-
native forms of Boyle’s Law are false and that we can derive
only one form of Boyle’s Law from the blind ascription. It is
likely that the disquotationalist objection is unsound.
So far, we have assumed that in blind ascriptions terms like
‘‘Boyle’s Law’’ select sentence tokens. Assume, instead, that
they select sentence types – would this strengthen the disquo-
tationalist case for derivability of D4 from D2? Again, we will
consider orthographic typing. The disquotationalist proposal,
on this reading, is that an I-statement of the form ‘‘Boyle’s Law
is ‘p’’’ says that the Boyle’s Law sentence type is identical to the
type picked out by the quotation name ‘‘p’’. The disquota-
tionalist might then argue that if ‘‘Boyle’s Law is ‘p’’’ is true,
‘‘Boyle’s Law is ‘q’’’ is false. Each sentence is named by only
one quotation name. For this reason, David says that premises
like ‘‘p’’ 6¼‘‘q’’ are ‘‘special. Because of the special properties of
quotation names, these premises are as safe as any instance of a
logical truth can be’’ (1994, p. 104). Then if it is true that the
Boyle’s Law sentence type is ‘‘p’’, given that ‘‘p’’ 6¼ ‘‘q’’, it
cannot be true that the Boyle’s Law sentence type is ‘‘q’’, and
the disquotationalist could derive D4 from D2. But this version
of the disquotationalist objection is unsound, because on this
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reading D2 is false. The sentence types picked out by terms like
‘‘Boyle’s Law’’ and ‘‘Fermat’s Last Theorem’’ are not demar-
cated by quotation names. Recall that there is more than one
way to state Boyle’s Law in English – e.g., ‘‘The pressure of an
ideal gas varies inversely with its volume at constant tempera-
ture’’. Since sentence types for terms like ‘‘Boyle’s Law’’ are not
individuated by quotation names, D2, read as a type–type
identity statement, is false. So interpreting I-statements as type–
type identity statements does not help disquotationalism.
Where sentences are typed orthographically, we have seen
that the disquotationalist objection has implausible conse-
quences both when ‘‘Boyle’s Law’’ is taken to pick out a sen-
tence token and when it is taken to pick out a sentence type.
But disquotationalists might hold that the diﬃculties described
above stem not from the proposed account of blind ascriptions,
but from the unwarranted assumption that sentences are typed
orthographically. Field proposes that the entities that fall in the
extension of the truth predicate are not orthographic types but
computational types: ‘‘equivalence classes of (potential) tokens
under the relation of computational equivalence’’ (2001, p.
151). The class of tokens or potential tokens consists of those
that are treated computationally as equivalent in the speaker’s
actual idiolect (2001, p. 158). The quote names in inﬁnite dis-
junctions and conjunctions would, presumably, pick out com-
putational sentence types, and as before, the quote names
would name uniquely, so that if ‘‘p’’ and ‘‘q’’ are distinct quote
names, they pick out distinct computational types. If we
imagine that terms like ‘‘Boyle’s Law’’ pick out computational
types too, then we can explain how sentences of orthographi-
cally distinct types can nevertheless belong to the same com-
putational type, so that there can be multiple (orthographic)
forms of Boyle’s Law. So far so good, but this approach does
not solve the disquotationalist’s problems with blind ascrip-
tions. Boyle’s Law may not fall into any computational type for
a scientiﬁcally inept speaker. In such a case the blind ascription
cannot fulﬁll its purported function, to allow him to assert the
Law without access to it. Even if the Law does fall into a
computational type for him, since computational types are
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settled within a speaker’s idiolect, there is no guarantee that a
blind ascription will allow him to assert what the scientiﬁcally
competent would take to be Boyle’s Law. In such a case, we
may guarantee that the blind ascription implies something, but
there is no reason to suppose that what it implies is the Law.
Again, the blind ascription does not fulﬁll its purported role.21
One solution is not available to disquotationalism. What is
needed is semantic sentence typing, rather than orthographic or
computational sentence typing. The I-statements might tell us
what semantic type Boyle’s Law belongs to – in eﬀect, what
proposition is expressed by sentences that count as Boyle’s Law.
This permits us to count more than one orthographic or pho-
netic sentence type as a single law. But on this view, the truth or
falsity of I-statements is determined by semantic facts, and this
rules out pure deﬂationism for blind ascriptions. While semantic
sentence typing is not available to disquotationalism, it could be
accommodated by other, proposition-friendly, varieties of def-
lationism, such as Horwich’s (1998a) minimalism or McGrath’s
(1997) weak deﬂationism. We would need an appropriately
gerrymandered inﬁnite disjunction so that each disjunct dealt
with a distinct proposition. Semantic typing might allow us to
construe the I-statements in such a way that truth of one would
ensure the falsity of all the others, so guaranteeing that D2 had
the right implications. Such a deﬂationism would not have to
treat seemingly true I-statements as false. But with semantic
typing, the truth of an I-statement would be a substantive
matter. So this would be deﬂationism for proposition truth only,
not for sentence truth – the sentence/truth-condition relation-
ship would be rich and not thin. Since our primary interest is in
disquotationalism I set this alternative deﬂationary proposal
aside. In the discussion to come, let us see what can be done with
disquotationalist-approved inﬁnite disjunctions.
5.
I have argued that disquotationalism is inadequate because it
does not account for the implications of blind ascriptions. But
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the disquotationalist might bite the bullet, claiming that blind
ascriptions do not have the implications they appear to have –
e.g., that C does not follow from D1 and D2. If it was suc-
cessful, this objection would permit the disquotationalist to
reassert an explanatory equivalence between blind ascriptions
and inﬁnite disjunctions, because the unexplained implication
of the blind ascription is dismissed as merely apparent.
The objection now under consideration makes a controver-
sial claim, i.e., that knowing that Boyle’s Law is ‘‘The product
of pressure and volume is exactly a constant for an ideal gas’’,
that Boyle’s Law is true, and what it means to say that some-
thing is true, is not enough to allow derivation of C. This
objection will not do. Such a disquotationalist fails to account
for all the facts about truth, in particular, for the standard
practice of using blind ascriptions as premises in certain infer-
ences.
Suppose that Guy says:
(16) Hendrix excused himself to kiss this guy.
Skye says, in sequence:
(17) What Guy said is true.
(18) People excuse themselves to do what they want to do.
and concludes:
(19) Hendrix wanted to kiss the sky.
The example makes use of a mondegreen, that is, a series of
words that result from the mishearing or misinterpretation of a
statement or song lyric. 22 In my book, what follows from (17)
and (18), given that Guy said (16), is not (19) but:
(20) Hendrix wanted to kiss this guy.
One of the steps in my chain of inference uses (17) and the
premise ‘‘Guy said ‘Hendrix excused himself to kiss this guy’’’
to derive ‘‘Hendrix excused himself to kiss this guy’’.
The bullet-biting disquotationalist denies that blind ascrip-
tions have the implications I think they have. So she cannot
allow an inferential step from (17) and the premise ‘‘Guy said
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‘Hendrix excused himself to kiss this guy’’’ to ‘‘Hendrix excused
himself to kiss this guy’’. For the bullet-biting disquotationalist,
there are no rules of inference allowing me to conclude (20)
from (17), (18), and the premise ‘‘Guy said ‘Hendrix excused
himself to kiss this guy’’’; similarly, there are no rules of
inference allowing Skye to conclude (19) from (17), (18), and
her mistaken premise ‘‘Guy said ‘Hendrix excused himself to
kiss the sky’’’. Thus the bullet-biting disquotationalist fails to
explain unexceptionable inferences from blind ascriptions.
Furthermore, while the implications of (17) conjoined with
‘‘What Guy said is _____’’ should be the same whether Skye
hears Guy correctly or not, they should diﬀer depending on
whether Guy said ‘‘Hendrix excused himself to kiss the sky’’ or
‘‘Hendrix excused himself to kiss this guy’’. But for the bullet-
biting disquotationalist, the implications of (17) and ‘‘What
Guy said is ____’’ do not diﬀer depending on what Guy said –
regardless of what he said, the inﬁnite disjunction that is sup-
posedly equivalent to Skye’s (17) is just the same.
Bullet-biting disquotationalism does not carry out the def-
lationist program. The purported aim of deﬂationism is to ex-
plain all the facts about truth. But the bullet-biting
disquotationalist does not do this; rather, she is revisionist
about the truth predicate, holding that it does not function as
we expect in blind ascriptions.
The revisionism is marked with JustSo ascriptions. As we
noted above, disquotationalism explains the use of blind
ascriptions in JustSo cases by appeal to pragmatic motivations
on the part of the speaker – the story is that the speaker might
just as well use the selected sentence, but employs the blind
ascription instead with the aim, for example, of acknowledging
someone else’s contribution to the conversation. But given
bullet-biting disquotationalism, the choice to use a blind
ascription rather than to repeat someone else’s words has a
sizable cost, since the blind ascription and the repetition do not
share their implications. The deﬂationist story about JustSo
ascriptions is undermined, because given bullet-biting disquo-
tationalism, the commitments of Skye’s blind ascription are
much weaker than a repetition of Guy’s words. Bullet-biting
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disquotationalism does not properly account for JustSo
ascriptions.
6.
Existentially quantiﬁed ascriptions pose parallel problems for
disquotationalism. Just as with blind ascriptions, disquota-
tionalism fails to explain why existentially quantiﬁed ascrip-
tions have the implications that they seem to have.
Suppose Linda says
(21) Something Jimi said is true.
Given that any reasonably loquacious person is likely to have
said something true once in a while, it is diﬃcult for (21) to
come out to be false unless we make use of the standard sup-
position that the context implicitly restricts the universe of
discourse – perhaps to sentences at a particular time or place or
on a certain topic. The restriction on the universe of discourse
restricts the number of disjuncts of the disquotationalist’s
inﬁnite disjunction that contain true I-statements of the form
‘‘Jimi said ‘p’’’. The less Jimi said in the designated period, the
fewer disjuncts are candidates for truth on the grounds of the
truth of their I-statements.
Now imagine that Jimi said only two things in the relevant
period – ‘‘Lately things just don’t seem the same’’ and ‘‘Jimi
kissed the sky’’. If we know he said only those things, from (21)
we ought to be able to infer
(22) Lately things just don’t seem the same or Jimi kissed the
sky.
An adequate account of existential ascriptions should have a
smooth account of this kind of inference, drawing on three
elements – the existential ascription itself, the desired account
of truth, and a premise specifying what Jimi said. Minimalism
provides the derivation as follows:
M6 Something Jimi said is true.
[Assumption]
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M7 Jimi said only <Lately things just don’t seem the same>
and <Jimi kissed the sky>. [Assumption]
M8<Lately things just don’t seem the same> is true if and
only if lately things just don’t seem the same and <Jimi
kissed the sky> is true if and only if Jimi kissed the sky.
[Axioms of the minimalist theory]
M9<Lately things just don’t seem the same> is true or
<Jimi kissed the sky> is true.
[from M6, M7]
C2 Lately things just don’t seem the same or Jimi kissed the
sky.
[from M8, M9]
But it is now old news that on the disquotationalist account,
the required implication does not hold. The disquotationalist
will need a premise in addition to those paralleling the mini-
malist’s M6, M7, and M8 – that is, he needs more than the
existential ascription itself, his account of truth, and a premise
specifying what Jimi said. The derivation proceeds as follows:
D6 Something Jimi said is true.
[Assumption]
D7 Jimi said only ‘‘Lately things just don’t seem the same’’
and ‘‘Jimi kissed the sky’’.
[Assumption]
D8 Jimi said ‘‘Lately things just don’t seem the same’’ and
lately things just don’t seem the same
or Jimi said ‘‘grass is green’’ and grass is green
or . . .
[Disq. analysis of D6]
D9 Jimi did not say ‘‘grass is green’’ and Jimi did not say
‘‘Jimi kissed this guy’’ and . . .
[Assumption]
D10 Jimi said ‘‘Lately things just don’t seem the same’’ and
lately things just don’t seem the same or Jimi said ‘‘Jimi
kissed the sky’’ and Jimi kissed the sky.
[from D8, D9]
C Lately things justdon’t seemthe sameor Jimikissed the sky.
[from D10]
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Bolstered by the ‘‘only’’ in D7, the disquotationalist may
think that D9 follows from D7. But this is a mistake. D7 is idle
in the derivation. D9 really is an additional premise, not a
logical freebie following from D7. D9’s conjuncts include some
contingent truths and a few falsities. It is familiar to us that the
method of sentence typing is crucial in considering whether D9
follows from D7 – it would, if we had semantic sentence typing,
but without semantic sentence typing it does not. In our dis-
cussion of Boyle’s Law, the issues turned on whether the dis-
quotationalist could manage with orthographic or
computational typing. Matters are a little diﬀerent in this case:
The sentences selected by the existentially quantiﬁed ascription
are spoken, not written, and Jimi produced only two tokens.
Since those tokens are of the phonetic types ‘‘Lately things just
don’t seem the same’’ and ‘‘Jimi kissed the sky’’, it might seem
reasonable to suppose that they are not of distinct types, such
as ‘‘Grass is green’’, ‘‘I am the eggman’’ or ‘‘I am the walrus’’.
Then, at ﬁrst blush, it might seem that the truth of the right two
I-statements will guarantee the falsity of the rest, allowing D9
to follow from D7. But phonetic sentence typing will fail be-
cause of the possibility of sound-alike mondegreens. If D7 is to
imply D9, the truth of the I-statement ‘‘Jimi said ‘Jimi kissed
the sky’’’ will have to guarantee that ‘‘Jimi said ‘Jimi kissed this
guy’’’ is false, but if we understand the I-statements as identi-
ﬁcations of tokens with phonetic types, ‘‘Jimi said ‘Jimi kissed
this guy’’’ is true. To think otherwise is to confuse phonetic
typing with orthographic typing. Orthographic sentence typing
cannot save the day, because proper orthographic sentence
typing in a case like this is dependent on proper semantic
sentence typing. Computational sentence typing is of no help,
because with computational typing, the truth of the inﬁnite
disjunction will not correspond with the truth of what Jimi
actually said, but rather with what Linda thinks he said. What
we need is semantic typing – then the truth of the two I-state-
ments of D7 will happily guarantee the falsity of the other
I-statements, and D7 would imply D9. Proposition-friendly
forms of deﬂationism could accommodate semantic sentence
typing, to deliver deﬂationism for proposition truth. But with
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semantic typing, the truth of an I-statement would be a sub-
stantive matter. So this would be deﬂationism for proposition
truth only, not for sentence truth.
The rest of my argument parallels that given for blind
ascriptions. Let me summarize. The argument shows that some
very strong versions of disquotationalism are false – those that
claim an intensional equivalence between existential ascriptions
and inﬁnite disjunctions. Existential ascriptions and inﬁnite
disjunctions do not have the same implications, so they are not
intensionally equivalent. My argument does not threaten the
disquotationalist thesis that existential ascriptions and inﬁnite
disjunctions are in some sense equivalent – they certainly are
materially equivalent. But nevertheless we can dismiss disquo-
tationalism as an adequate theory of truth, because it does not
explain why existentially quantiﬁed ascriptions have the
implications that they do. There is more to existential ascrip-
tions than equivalence to inﬁnite disjunctions, something which
allows the existential ascription to imply the truth of one of the
things Jimi said more immediately (i.e., with fewer additional
premises) than the inﬁnite disjunction. Since equivalence to an
inﬁnite disjunction does not exhaust the properties of existen-
tially quantiﬁed ascriptions, disquotationalism fails to account
for all the uses of ‘‘is true’’.
7.
The conclusions of this paper show that disquotationalism is
not successful in accounting for existentially quantiﬁed and
blind ascriptions, because it cannot explain why these
ascriptions have the implications that they have. So what
should deﬂationism be when it grows up? If it wants a paying
job it should not be disquotationalism, because disquota-
tionalism cannot fulﬁl the job description of accounting for
the central varieties of truth ascription.23 Other career paths,
that admit propositions, are open to deﬂationism. These in-
clude, but are not limited to, Horwich’s (1998a) minimalism
and McGrath’s (1997) weak deﬂationism. But these kinds of
deﬂationism may not satisfy a truly deﬂationist soul, because
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they may have to allow for substantivism about sentence
truth.24
NOTES
1 For more on understanding the distinction between varieties of deﬂa-
tionism in this way, see Bar-On et al. (forthcoming). It is well-recognized
that deﬂationism must account for all the uses of ‘‘true’’ – see, for example,
David (1994, p. 73). Regarding the centrality of these three kinds of truth
ascription, see a useful discussion in Kirkham (1995, pp. 317–325). The
terminology I adopt here, of explicit and blind ascriptions, is reasonably
widely used, even though one of the issues is whether truth is ever ascribed
to anything at all. Explicit ascriptions are sometimes known as revealing
ascriptions (e.g., Ku¨nne, 2002), and blind ascriptions are sometimes known
as indirect endorsements (e.g., Shapiro, 1998). Of course ‘‘true’’ and ‘‘truth’’
pop up in other constructions as well, such as ‘‘He is a true patriot’’, and ‘‘It
is a true likeness’’. These additional uses may be either metaphorical or
parasitic on the primary cases of blind and explicit ascriptions. For dis-
cussion, see White (1970).
2 The target of this paper is deﬂationism that takes sentences as truth-
bearers, and the truth predicate to be a device that either forms inﬁnite
disjunctions and conjunctions, or obviates the need for the formation of
inﬁnite disjunctions and conjunctions. My argument has no impact on other
kinds of deﬂationism, the most inﬂuential contemporary examples being the
minimalism of Horwich (1998a) and the prosentential approaches of Grover
et al. (1975) and Brandom (1994).
3 Disquotationalism’s ability to handle non-explicit ascriptions is often
noted as a virtue, particularly in contrast with early versions of deﬂationism
like Ramsey’s (1964) redundancy theory. Horwich (an advocate of mini-
malism rather than disquotationalism), says the redundancy theory must be
rejected for its failure to account for ‘‘genuinely useful attributions of truth’’
such as ‘‘Oscar’s claim is true’’ (1998a, pp. 39-40) and that ‘‘the Quinean
account is clearly superior’’ to the redundancy theory (1999, footnote 4,
p. 241) since the latter
had nothing much to say about the function of our concept of truth. But if it
really is redundant, why on earth do we have such a notion? A virtue of
minimalism is that it contains a satisfying response to this question – one
that was ﬁrst proposed by Quine – namely that the truth predicate plays a
vital role in enabling us to capture certain generalizations (1999, p. 241).
Williams tells us:
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The great advance of Quine’s view over the redundancy theory then – an
advance which its current rivals preserve – is that it shows how truth talk
contributes signiﬁcantly to the expressive resources of our language. . .
[‘‘True’’ enables us] to express agreement and disagreement with sentences
that we cannot specify: for example, because we do not know exactly what
they are (‘‘What the President said is true’’) or because there are too many of
them (‘‘Every sentence of the form ‘P or not P’’’ is true) (1999, p. 547,
emphasis mine).
In a similar vein, Schantz tells us that Quinean disquotationalism ‘‘is a
great advance beyond the redundancy theory because it oﬀers an illumi-
nating answer to the pressing question as to why we have the word true’ in
our language, which Ramsey remained silent about’’ (2002, p. 6). Soames
also makes a thorough case against the redundancy theory on these grounds
(1999, pp. 40–49). But see Gupta (1993) who argues that the deﬂationist
treatment of universally quantiﬁed ascriptions is inadequate. Gupta’s con-
clusion, coupled with mine, suggests that disquotationalism is adequate only
for explicit ascriptions.
4 Disquotationalism is often criticized for its failure to account for attri-
butions of truth couched in language L to a sentence of a distinct language
M. Disquotationalists like Resnik (1990) and Field (1994, 2001) argue that
the truth predicate is properly applicable to sentences of one’s own natural
language (Resnik) or one’s own idiolect (Field), and therefore disquota-
tionalists who adopt their position might be considered immune to this
criticism. (For further discussion, see Shapiro, 2003.) Such disquotational-
ists are not immune to the argument of this paper, because it shows that
disquotationalism has trouble accounting for attributions of truth in lan-
guage L to sentences of language L, even where the sentences in question are
part of one’s own idiolect.
5 Proponents of disquotationalism in addition to Quine include Leeds
(1978), Resnik (1990) and Field (1994).
6 See for example Leeds (1978, pp. 121–122) and Field (1994). Field says
it will help to ask what a deﬂationist should say about why we need a truth
predicate. If truth conditions aren’t central to meaning, why not drop talk of
truth altogether? As is well known, the deﬂationist’s answer is that the word
‘‘true’’ has an important logical role: it allows us to formulate certain inﬁnite
conjunctions and disjunctions that can’t be formulated otherwise. There are
some very mundane examples of this, for instance, where we remember that
someone said something false yesterday but can’t remember what it was.
What we are remembering is equivalent to the inﬁnite disjunction of all
sentences of form ‘‘She said ‘p’, but not-p’’ (pp. 263–264).
Blackburn and Simmons (1999) and David (1994) oﬀer useful recon-
structions of this position.
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7 Whereas each conjunct in an inﬁnite conjunction such as (7) is itself a
conditional on the model ‘‘If Smith’s Theorem is ‘Grass is green’, then grass
is green’’, to deliver material equivalence with (5) the disjuncts in an inﬁnite
disjunction such as (9) must be conjunctions, not similar conditionals. If any
of the antecedents of the conditionals are false (as most of them will be), as a
whole an inﬁnite disjunction of conditionals is true, even if Smith’s Theorem
is false. This consideration does not rule out treating a blind ascription as an
inﬁnite conjunction of conditionals, but that treatment is ruled out by other
considerations of material equivalence. Suppose Smith, the washed-up
mathematician, encourages us to believe (falsely) that he has a new theorem,
to be known as Smith’s Theorem. Intuitively in these circumstances the
blind ascription ‘‘Smith’s Theorem is true’’ is not true, but an inﬁnite con-
junction of conditionals as described above would be true, so for material
equivalence blind ascriptions cannot be inﬁnite conjunctions of condition-
als. But see Resnik (1990, p. 412).
8 Quine (1970) allows attribution of truth to sentence types for so-called
eternal sentences. Quine (1990) proposes that we consider all ‘‘truth vehi-
cles’’ to be eternal sentences, with appropriate modiﬁcations to sentence
tokens to generate eternal sentences.
9 Field avers that we can apply disquotational truth to tokens.
[O]nce we remember that ‘‘disquotationally true’’ means ‘‘true-as-I-inter-
pret-it’’, the obvious thing to say is that an utterance of ‘‘p(i1,. . .,in)’’ is
disquotationally true (for me, that is, as I understand it) iﬀ the sentence is
true relative to the values of a1,. . .,an I regard as appropriate to associate
with the indexicals (1994, pp. 279–280).
He concludes that disquotationalism faces no special diﬃculty in dealing
with indexical tokens (1994, p. 280).
10 Minimalism about truth addresses indexical cases by admitting proposi-
tions to the ontology, and holding that blind ascriptions such as (11) ascribe
truth to a proposition, rather than to a sentence. On this view, Mary’s blind
ascriptionpicks out the propositionaccompanyingFred’s utterance, thatFred
would not make a good clergyman. That blithe solution is not available to the
disquotationalist: A supposed advantage of disquotationalism, championed
byQuine (1970) andField (1994), is that (unlike other versionsof deﬂationism)
it does not posit propositions. See, for example, Field (1994, pp. 266–267).
11 I will say that blind ascriptions select a sentence rather than saying that
they pick out or refer to a sentence. The latter terminology might seem to
beg the question against deﬂationism, by suggesting that truth ascriptions
refer to and attribute a property to a sentence.
12 Throughout the discussion I hold ﬁxed the sentence (or, for minimalism,
proposition) selected by the blind ascription, since we cannot expect the
implications to remain the same if we allow the selected truth-bearer to vary.
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The blind ascription (5) has the implications speciﬁed only given the
assumption that Boyle’s Law is what it is.
13 I have followed Horwich’s (1998a, p. 21) example of the derivation of
‘‘Snow is white’’ from ‘‘What Smith said was true’’ and ‘‘What Smith said
was that snow is white’’. Horwich emphasizes that this is ‘‘precisely the sort
of reasoning on which the utility of our concept of truth depends’’ on p. 39.
14 Gupta (1993) argues that inﬁnite conjunctions and disjunctions are not
synonymous with the purported truth ascriptions because the former, but not
the latter, require for understanding amassive ideology – an understanding of
a vast number of words. The argument here is distinct, because it rests on the
claim that inﬁnite disjunctions and blind ascriptions do not share their
implications. Gupta makes a similar claim for inﬁnite conjunctions and uni-
versally quantiﬁed truth ascriptions, pointing out that a universally quantiﬁed
truth ascription does not have the same implications as a conjunction of its
instances.
15 We have shown that they do not share their implications without
entertaining any counterfactual claims and without considering attributions
of truth to sentences of a foreign language, so this conclusion aﬀects
immanent versions of disquotationalism, cf. footnote 4.
16 If disquotationalism can generate a peculiarly deﬂationist position from
the equivalence of blind ascriptions and inﬁnite disjunctions, more must be
said about the equivalence of inﬁnite disjunctions and blind ascriptions.
Claiming material equivalence between the two does not constitute a dis-
tinctive deﬂationist view, since material equivalence of non-explicit ascrip-
tions and inﬁnite conjunctions or disjunctions is assured on any half-decent
theory of truth, deﬂationist or otherwise. All that is needed for material
equivalence of (5) and (9) is a theory that preserves the truth predicate’s
normal truth-functional pattern.
17 In the literature, I-statements are often expressed using ‘‘=’’, e.g., ‘‘What
Claire said ¼ ‘aardvarks amble’,’’ (Blackburn and Simmons, 1999, p. 13).
This encourages the view that the ‘‘is’’ in the disjuncts of (9) is meant to be
the ‘‘is’’ of identity. In calling these statements I-statements, I remain neutral
(for now) about whether these are indeed identity statements.
18 This is Blackburn and Simmons’s assumption too (1999, p. 13 and
footnote 22). See also David (1994, pp. 102–103).
19 In this way, quote names are distinct from other kinds of names – things
can have more than one name, but sentences cannot have more than one
quote name (David, 1994, pp. 103–104).
20 Given the contingent facts about Boyle’s Law, it will turn out that the
only disjuncts with true I-statements are those that mention the theorem in
one of its forms. So the inﬁnite disjunction plus the facts about what the
theorem is plus a set of non-I-statements (e.g., Boyle’s Law is not
‘‘e ¼ mc2’’) will in fact imply the theorem, because each disjunct that is not
ruled out by the non-I-statements will have the theorem in one form or
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another as its second conjunct. This does not defeat the argument given to
the conclusion that blind ascriptions are not intensionally equivalent to
inﬁnite disjunctions.
21 This may not worry Field, who says
‘‘True’’ in the purely disquotational sense means ‘‘true as I understand it’’:
it doesn’t mean ‘‘true on the correct understanding of it’’, because the idea
of a ‘‘correct understanding’’ of a sentence or utterance is a semantic
notion that has no place when we are discussing purely disquotational
truth. If on my understanding of ‘‘Der Schnee ist weiss’’ it is equivalent to
‘‘E ¼ mc2’’, then for me this sentence is disquotationally true iﬀ E ¼ mc2.
Anyone in the grip of the Frege-Russell tradition will think that this shows
that we need a notion of truth conditions very diﬀerent from the dis-
quotational one; but I don’t think it at all obvious that they are right
(1994, p. 278).
For a rich discussion of Field’s position, see Shapiro (2003).
22 The term is commonly attributed to Wright (1954), who reports mis-
hearing the song ‘‘The Bonny Earl of Murray.’’ She heard the phrase ‘‘hae
laid him on the green’’ as ‘‘Lady Mondegreen’’.
23 The elimination of disquotationalism as an adequate theory of truth
may have bearing on a number of central questions about deﬂationism,
e.g., whether deﬂationism can be coupled with an adequate theory of
meaning (canvassed by, for example, Dummett, 1959; Horwich, 1998b;
Williams, 1999; Bar-On et al., 2000), and whether deﬂationism explains the
normative value of truth (canvassed by, for example, Dummett, 1959;
Horwich, 2002; Williams, 2002). Discussion of the impact of the conclu-
sions of this paper on these further questions must be reserved for another
occasion.
24 This project was supported by a grant from the University of Missouri
Research Board. The paper has gained from many helpful discussions with
and comments from friends and colleagues. Thanks in particular to an
anonymous referee, Marian David, Reinaldo Elugardo, Robert Johnson,
Jonathan Kvanvig, William Lycan, Matthew McGrath, Peter Markie,
Andrew Melnyk, Andrew Mills and Adam Morton, and to audiences at the
University of Oklahoma, the Central Division of the American Philosoph-
ical Association, and the Central States Philosophical Association.
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